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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Order, dated February 23, 2001, and the Final 
Order and Judgment, dated April 1,2002, of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Hon. A. Lynn 
Payne, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j); to wit, appeal from a District Court 
decision dismissing certain causes of action on summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVffiW, 
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY, AND CITATIONS TO THE RECORD 
I DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DETERMINING ON SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT THAT THERE WAS NO BASIS TO SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIMS UNDER THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND 
FAIR DEALING, FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY FEES 
WHERE THE COURT ALSO FOUND THAT DEFENDANT DENIED 
CLAIMS WHICH WERE OWED UNDER THE INSURANCE POLICY? 
On an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the Court of Appeals reviews 
the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. 
v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187,1189 (Utah App. 1993). Whether an insured's claim is fairly debatable 
under a given set of facts is a question of law. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P. 2d 
461, 464 (Utah 1996) ("Billings II"). 
The above issue was preserved in the trial court for appeal because it forms one of the 
bases upon which the Order, dated February 23, 2001, was entered (See Order (T. at 344)), 
as set forth in die Transcript of the Motion for Summary Judgment hearing held January 30, 
2001 (See Transcript (T. at 595). 
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II DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING STORAGE EXPENSES ON 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN LIGHT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE PLAINTIFF AND THE JULIE LEWIS TRUST, IN LIGHT OF THE 
FACT THAT U.S.F.&G. PAID STORAGE COSTS, AND IN LIGHT OFTHE 
FACT THAT THE COURT AWARDED CLEANUP, SITE RESTORATION, 
AND TOWING COSTS WHICH WERE IN-HOUSE SERVICES 
PERFORMED BY THE PLAINTIFF? 
On an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the Court of Appeals reviews 
the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. 
v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah App. 1993). Summary judgment is only appropriate when 
there are no issues of genuine fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803, 805 & n.2 
(Utah 1991) ^Billings I"). Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment as a 
matter of law, the Court of Appeals gives no deference to the trial court's view of law, but 
reviews it for correctness. Uloh Stale Coal. ofSr. Citizens v. Utah Power and Light Co., 116 
P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989). 
The above issue was preserved in the trial court for appeal because it forms the other 
basis upon which the Order, dated February 23, 2001, was entered (See Order (T. at 344)), 
as set forth in the Transcript of the Motion for Summary Judgment hearing held January 30, 
2001 (See Transcript (T. at 595). 
DETCRMINATrVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is believed to be determinative of this appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff to recover damages against Defendant for 
denying certain insurance claims where Defendant is the insurer and Plaintiff is die insured 
under an insurance contract. The claims arose following an accident involving Plaintiffs 
insured crane and other equipment which were a total loss. Defendant paid on a portion of 
the appraised value of the equipment but did not pay the balance of the appraised value nor 
on Plaintiffs claims for towing, salvage and cleanup and did not pay for storage. Plaintiff 
contends that Defendant acted unreasonably in denying these claims and therefore breached 
the express terms of the contract and breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
II. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this matter against the Defendant on October 2, 
1998, requesting damages under the insurance contract for the balance of the appraised value 
of the equipment, for towing, salvage and cleanup and for storage fees, and for punitive 
damages, attorney fees, and interest and requesting a jury trial. (T. at 3-10). After having 
accepted service of process (T. at 23), Defendant filed a petition for removal to the Federal 
District Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship (T. at 24-42). The parties conducted 
discovery, the Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and supporting memorandum 
and the Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to motion for summary judgment while 
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the matter was pending in die Federal Court (T. 49-221). Rather than ruling on the motion 
for summary judgment, die Federal District Court remanded the matter back to die state court 
by order dated September 7, 2000, on die basis of not meeting die amount in controversy (T. 
at 49-221). The Defendant then filed a motion for summary judgment and memorandum in 
support in die state court on November 21, 2000 (T. at 222-269). Plaintiff filed a 
memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment and a request for hearing on 
December 6, 2000 (T. at 270-338). The hearing on die motion for summary judgment was 
held on January 30, 2001 (T. at 341-342). A transcript of diis hearing has been included widi 
die record on appeal (T. at 595). Following die hearing on die motion for summary judgment, 
die court, in its Order dated February 23, 2001, held diat die express terms of the contract 
allowed for the payment of towing, salvage and cleanup and for storage fees, but determined 
that whedier die Defendant was required to pay for these items was fairly debatable (See 
Order, T. at 345-348) (See Transcript, T. at 595, pages 26-30 dierein). The court, therefore, 
determined diat there was no breach of die implied covenant of good faidi and fair dealing and 
dismissed die Plaintiffs claims for punitive damages and attorney fees (Id.). The court furdier 
dismissed the claim for storage fees on die basis that the Plaintiff did not incur storage fees 
(Id.). The Court reserved die issue of die calculation of towing, salvage and cleanup, and 
interest for trial (Id.). The matter was scheduled for Jury Trial (T. at 357-358, 376-377, and 
379-380). The Plaintiff waived die jury trial on die basis that die only issue remaining were 
the calculation of die cleanup c osts (T. at 514-515, 345-348). The trial on the reserved issues 
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was held on February 5, 2002 (T. at 514-515). The Final Order and Judgment was entered 
by the Court on April 1, 2002 (T. at 574-576). Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal was filed on April 
30,2002 (T. at 580-581). Pages 26-30 of the transcript of the summary judgment hearing (T. 
at 595), die Order on the motion for summary judgment (T. at 345-348), and die Final Order 
and Judgment (T. at 574-576) are enclosed in the Addendum to this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. On August 27, 1997, a semi truck (a 1982 Ford LT9000), with attached crane, 
trailer and cargo wrecked on U.S. Highway 191, in Uintah County (T. at 223, 270). 
2. The semi truck and crane were insured by the Defendant. The cargo and trailer 
were insured by U.S.F.&G on a separate policy (T. at 223, 225, and 270). 
3. Immediately following the accident, the Plaintiff sent a crew of its employees with 
another crane, another semi truck and another flat bed trailer to haul the wrecked equipment to 
a storage yard and to clean and restore the accident site (T. at 224, 271). 
4. Plaintiff delivered die wrecked semi and crane to an enclosed storage yard owned 
by the Julie Lewis Trust. Julie Lewis is mentally handicapped and is the daughter of Junior 
Lewis. Junior Lewis is an officer, director and shareholder of Plaintiff and is also a trustee of 
the Julie Lewis Trast. The storage yard is approximately 6 acres in area, and is enclosed with 
a fence and is gated (T. at 225, 272, 308-318). 
5. Within one month of the accident, Plaintiff settled the insurance claim on the cargo 
and on the bailer with U.S.F&G. U.S.F&G paid storage fees for the time the trailer was held 
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at the yard owned by the Julie Lewis Trust. In the meantime, Plaintiff and Defendant could not 
agree on a settlement value on tlie semi and crane (T. at 225-226, 272-275). 
6. In December 1997, an appraiser determined the value to be $55,000.00 which the 
parties agreed upon. After tlie appraisal, in January 1998, die Defendant sent a payment which, 
along with a prior payment, amounted to all but $10,000.00 of the appraised value of tlie semi 
and trailer. Plamtiff accepted this payment. Shortly thereafter, in or about March of 1998, the 
Defendant sent a $10,000.00 check to tlie Plamtiff with a document releasing Defendant of all 
other claims (T. at 530-531). 
7. The court determined at trial that tlie acceptance of the $10,000.00 check would 
have constituted a waiver of all claims by tlie Plaintiff and ordered that interest on the 
$10,000.00 should accrue to the date of judgment (T. at 531, 575). 
8. The PlaintiIf refused tlie check and demanded payment of the balance of the 
appraised value hi the am )unt of $10,000, plus interest, plus debris removal, towing and site 
cleanup in the amount of $2,9 10.00, plus interest and storage fees in tlie amount of $50.00 per 
day, plus interest. However, Defendant maintained that it did not owe cleanup, towing and 
salvage, nor storage and refused to offer payment on these demands and refused to pay the 
balance of the $10,000 until the other items were settled (T. at 226). 
9. Because of Defendants failure to settle Plaintiff s claims, Plaintiff filed its 
complaint on October 2, i998, requesting judgment on the insurance contract for the cleanup, 
towing and salvage, plus storage, plus the $10,000 balance on the appraisal, plus interest, 
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attorney fees and punitive damages (T. at 3-10). 
10. The insurance contract at issue in the case set forth in part tlie following language: 
COMMERCIAL INLAND MARINE CONDITIONS 
LOSS CONDITIONS 
C. DUTIES IN THE EVENT OF LOSS 
You must see that the following are done in the event of 
"loss" to Covered Property. 
4. Take all reasonable steps to protect the Covered Property 
from further damage. If feasible, set the damage property 
aside and in the best possible order for examination. Also 
keep a record of your expenses for consideration. 
(T. at 235-243). The insurance contract is attached hereto in the Addendum. 
11. At tlie hearing on summaiy judgement, the Court, in the transcript of the 
proceedings stated, in part, the following, with respect to tlie claim for cleanup costs, as the basis 
for the Order on summary judgement (T. at 345-348): 
THE COURT NOTES THAT THE DEFENDANT DOES 
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE PROPERTY (SIC.) DOES 
COVER CLEAN UP EXPENSES BUT MAINTAINS THAT 
BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF USED ITS OWN EMPLOYEES 
AND RESOURCES IT DOES NOT INCUR EXPENSE, AND I 
THINK THAT THAT IS NOT A SUPPORTABLE POSITION TO 
TAKE. . . . I'M NOT SAYING THAT THE AMOUNT IS OR IS 
NOT REASONABLE, BUT I'M SAYING THAT BECAUSE 
CLEARLY THERE IS AN ISSUE AS TO THIS MATTER WITH 
RESPECT TO WHAT THE COSTS MAY BE, AND I'LL RULE 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT THEIR COSTS -
REASONABLE COSTS IN DOING THE WORK IS AS GOOD AS 
ANYBODY ELSE'S REASONABLE COSTS IN DOING THE 
WORK FOR THE REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME, THE 
REASONABLE EXPENSE THAT WOULD BE INCURRED. SO 
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YOUR MOTION IS DENIED AS TO CLEANUP COSTS. 
(T. at 595, p. 27). 
11. The Coin t however determined that the claim for storage costs should be dismissed 
although the contract allowed for storage costs because, as with the cleanup, the Plaintiff, 
thought the Julie Lewis Trust, provided the storage. The transcript on this issue states the 
following: 
AS TO STORAGE, THE DEFENDANT ARGUES THAT THE 
CONTRACT EXCLUDED CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES AND 
PLAINTIFF MAINTAINS THAT THIS IS A CONSEQUENTIAL 
DAMAGE. AND THEN IN THIS CASE THE PLAINTIFF ALSO 
POINTS TO OTHER CONTRACT PROVISIONS WHICH 
IMPOSE UPON THE PLAINTIFF AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO 
PROTECT THE PROPERTY FROM FURTHER DAMAGE. 
AND I THINK THE ACTION OF TAKING THIS PLACE (SIC.) 
TO A PLACE THAT COULD BE PROTECTED IS, AS I'VE 
1ND19CATLD, REASONABLE AND I THINK IT'S CERTAINLY 
A CONSEQUL ITIAL DAMAGE IN THE SENSE THAT THIS IS 
SOMETHtf !G 1 JAT HAPPENS IN A LOT OF. . . SITUATIONS. 
IN THIS CASr IF THERE IS AN AMBIGUITY THE COURT 
MUST CO^S RUE THAT AGAIN IN A WAY THAT A 
REASONA3LI* PERSON IN THE INSURED WOULD 
CONSTRU I 1 IE CONTRACT, AND I CAN'T SAY AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, THAT THE CONTRACT EXCLUDES 
STORAGE C STS. IN FACT, I THINK THAT THAT'S 
PRETTY C - EA11 TO ME THAT THE INSURANCE COMPANY 
(SIC.) IS ENT1 TLED TO REASONABLE STORAGE COSTS. 
THE MOTION IS THEREFORE DENIED WITH RESPECT TO 
THE ISSUE OF STORAGE COSTS. 
(T. at 595, p. 27-28). 
12. The court however dismissed Plaintiffs claim for storage costs and stated the 
following, as set forth in l'ie -conscript, as the basis therefore: 
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I REALLY THINK THE ESSENCE OF THE CONTRACT IS TO 
INSURE AGAINST LOSS AND EXPENSES WHICH WERE 
INCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE LOSS. AND I WOULD 
TAKE A DIFFERENT VIEW OF THIS IF THERE WERE 
ACTUAL OBLIGATIONS INCURRED. IN THIS CASE IT'S 
CLEAR TO ME THAT THE PLAINTIFF INCURRED NO 
ADDITIONAL COSTS OR EXPENSES BY REASON OF THE 
FACT THAT THE INSURANCE - THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD 
A RIGHT UNDER AN EXISTING AGREEMENT THAT THEY 
HAD WITH THE TRUST TO STORE PROPERTY ON THE 
PLACE WHERE... THE EQUIPMENT WAS TAKEN. AND AS 
WE HAVE DISCUSSED . . . THERE WERE NO ADDITIONAL 
EXPENSES. AND UNLIKE THE PREVIOUS ISSUE OF CLEAN 
UP COSTS WHERE THE PLAINTIFF COULD SAY, LOOK I 
HAD EMPLOYEES WORKING AND I HAD . . . EQUIPMENT 
WORKING. IN THIS CASE THERE HAD BEEN NO ACTUAL 
EXPENSES INCURRED RELATING TO THE STORAGE AND 
NEITHER IS THE PLAINTIFF LIABLE TO THE THIRD PARTY 
FOR STORAGE. BECAUSE THE STORAGE OF THE CRANE 
CLEARLY COMES WITHIN THE PRIOR AGREEMENT TO 
STORE EQUIPMENT ON THE PROPERTY. THEREFORE 
UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE NO ADDITIONAL 
EXPENSES HAVE BEEN INCURRED AND 1 BELIEVE THAT 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A WINDFALL HERE. 
THAT PLAINTIFF IS NOT IN THE BUSINESS OF STORING 
CRANES. AS I INDICATED, IF HE WOULD'VE BEEN IN THE 
BUSINESS I SUPPOSE THERE COULD'VE BEEN AN 
ARGUMENT THAT SINCE I'M IN THE BUSINESS OF 
STORING CRANES, AND I STORED THIS CRANE, I LOST 
INCOME AND I'M ENTITLED TO SOME REIMBURSEMENT. 
. . . ALTHOUGH I THINK THAT THE CONTRACT DOES 
PROVIDE FOR STORAGE IN THE APPROPRIATE SITUATION 
I DON'T THINK THIS IS AN APPROPRIATE SITUATION 
BECAUSE I DON'T THINK THERE'S BEEN ANY DAMAGES 
INCURRED. 
(T. at 595, p. 28-29). 
13. The Court also dismissed all claims related to the good faith and fair dealing cause 
of action, including attorney fees and punitive damages. As its reasoning for this dismissal, the 
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Court stated the following in the transcript of the summary judgment hearing: 
WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF BAD FAITH THAT WILL 
BE ALSO BE (SIC.) DISMISSED. I THINK THAT THESE 
MATTERS WERE - AS A MATTER OF LAW I THINK THAT 
THEY WERE ALL FAIRLY DEBATABLE, AND ESPECIALLY 
WHEN IT'S CLEAR THAT EVEN AFTER THE AGREEMENT 
WAS MAINTAINED THE PLAINTIFF CONTINUED TO HOLD 
TO THE IDEA THAT THEY WERE ENTITLED TO STORAGE 
COSTS AND REFUSED TO SETTLE. I DON'T THINK THAT 
THERE'S AN ACTION HERE FOR BAD FAITH AND 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES, OF COURSE, RELY UPON THE BAD 
FAITH, AND SO THAT WILL BE DISMISSED. 
AS WILL THE ISSUES AS TO ATTORNEYS' FEES AS THEY 
RELATE TO BAD FAITH OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
(T. at 595, p. 29-30) 
14. Since die only issues remaining after the Order on summary judgment were the 
calculation of the cleanup costs and interest, and because the court dismissed the issues of bad 
faith and punitive damages, the Plaintiff waived the jury trial prior to the trial (T. at 514-515). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The express terms of the insurance contract provided for the payment of cleanup, towing, 
salvage, and storage. However, Defendant refused to pay for these items and additionally 
withheld on $ 10,000 of the appraised value of the equipment unless Plaintiff released Defendant 
from the other claims. The Court determined in the findings, set fortli in the transcript (T. at 
595, p. 26-30), that the contract was not vague as to Defendant's obligation to pay cleanup, 
towing and salvage, and that the contract, by its express tenns also allowed for payment of 
storage fees. Therefore, the court determined that the Defendant should pay for the cleanup 
claimed by the Plaintiff; but that the Plaintiff is not entitled to storage on the basis that Plaintiff 
did not incur storage costs. However, despite the fact that the Defendant breached die express 
terms of the contract regarding cleanup and the appraised value, and without the Defendant 
presenting any evidence to support that it had acted reasonably in denying those claims, the court 
nevertheless determined that there was no issue of fact with respect to the issue of breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The facts presented by the parties in briefing 
the summary judgment motion if anything, added to the notion that there was an issue to be 
presented to the jury as to whether the Defendant acted reasonably in denying the claims of the 
Plaintiff. Therefore, the case should be remanded to the trial court for determination of the 
issue of whether the Defendant acted reasonably in denying the claims, whether the Defendant 
should have paid on those claims for which there was no fairly debatable defense and should 
have not withheld those items as leverage against Plaintiffs other claims, and whether 
Defendant's actions constitute a breach of its implied warranty of good faith and fair dealing for 
which attorney fees and punitive damages may be awarded. 
ARGUMENT 
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING ON SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT THAT THERE WAS NO BASIS TO SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIMS UNDER THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND 
FAIR DEALING, FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY FEES 
WHERE THE COURT ALSO FOUND THAT DEFENDANT DENIED 
CLAIMS WHICH WERE OWED UNDER THE INSURANCE POLICY. 
As set forth in the Statement of Facts and the Course of the Proceedings above, in this 
case, the trial court dismissed the actions for attorney fees and punitive damages which applied 
11 
to the claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fan* dealing on summary 
judgment. In other words, the court determined that there were no issues of fact on (lie issue of 
whether the Defendant acted reasonably in denying die claims of the Plaintiff for cleanup and 
storage costs. This determination was made despite the fact that the court determined that, as 
a matter of law, the contract allowed for cleanup and for storage and that the Defendant's denial 
of cleanup was not a supportable position for the Defendant to take and despite the fact that the 
Defendant was withholding an additional $10,000.00 on the appraised value of the equipment 
until the Plaintiff released all of the claims. In doing so, the Court denied the Plaintiff the 
opportunity to present the issues related to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
and the associated attorney fees and punitive damages, to 1he ultimate finder of fact, which 
would have been the jury. 
This case is veiy similar to other cases presented to the Utah Court of Appeals and the 
Utah Supreme Court. In die case of Pugh v. North American Warranty Services, 1 P.3d 570 
(Utah App. 2000), the question was whether a vehicle service contract is a contract of insurance 
and whether there was a breach of die implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The 
Court of Appeals determined that the service contract was a contract of insurance. In Pugh, as 
hi this case, the contract was a first-party insurance contract. In Pugh, the trial court determined 
diat there had been a breach of the implied covenant. In upholding the trial court in its award 
of attorney fees, the Court of Appeals stated as follows: 
. . . North American contends the trial court's award [of attorney 
fees] was improper because the court failed to make a finding that 
Pugh's claim for payment by North American was not at least 
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"fairly debatable." 
. . . the question of whetlier Pugh's claim was "fairly debatable" is 
a legal conclusion to be drawn from the trial court's findings rather 
than a finding in its own right. The trial court found that the 
transmission breakdown was "covered by the warranty agreement" 
and that North American "delayed unreasonably in . . . paying for 
covered repairs when the need was established." These findings 
compel the legal conclusion that North American's liability was 
crystal clear under the warranty contract and was in no sense 
debatable. 
Pugh, 1 P.3d at 574, n. 4. (Citations omitted). The court in Pugh further stated, "Whetlier the 
implied covenant of good faith performance was breached by North American is a fact-intensive 
inquiry, ordinarily left for the fact-finder." Pugh, 1 P.3d at 576. 
In this case, the court determined that the Defendant's denial of the cleanup expenses is 
"not a supportable position to take." (T. at 595, p. 27). Also, the court failed to make any 
finding as to whether the Defendant's withholding of $10,000.00 on the appraised value until 
the other claims were released was also not a supportable position. Following the reasoning in 
Pugh, die obligation of the Defendant to promptly pay to the Plaintiff the $ 10,000.00 withheld 
on the appraised value and the cleanup costs were crystal clear and in no sense "fairly 
debatable." These obligations were independent of the storage fees claim asserted by the 
Plaintiff and should have been promptly paid out despite the non-settlement of the storage fees 
issue. If such practice were allowed, to witliliold claims which are not fairly debatable until all 
claims are settled, then insureds, such as the Plaintiff, would be under pressure to release the 
fairly debatable claims, which they are entitled to pursue, independent of the non-fairly 
debatable claims, in order to get the non-fairly debatable claims paid. Such a practice would 
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create great difficulty for insureds in most cases. In this case, the Plaintiff needed the money 
on the crane to purchase another crane which was vital to its business. If the Plaintiff did not 
otherwise have the capability to purchase another crane before its claims against the insurance 
company were settled, then Plaintiffs business would have been under extreme pressure to 
release the fairly debatable claims so it could get the other money due under the policy. If such 
were allowed, the insurance company would be in a position of unfair advantage over its 
insured. Such a practice clearly constitutes unfair dealing on the part of the Defendant and a 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
In deed, this reasoning, set forth in the prior paragraph, is consistent with the reasoning 
of the Utali Supreme Court hi the case ofBillings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461 (Utali 
1996) (^'Billings IF), hi Billings II, the court, as in this case, was also dealing with a first-party 
insurance contract, hi Billings II, court stated as follows: 
The terms used to characterize these duties plainly indicate that the 
overriding requirement imposed by the implied covenant is that 
insurers act reasonably, as an objective matter, in dealing with their 
insureds. 
Billings II, 918 P.2d at 465. The court further stated in a footnote as follows: 
We emphasize that whether an insurer has acted reasonably is an 
objective question to be determined without considering the 
insurer's objective state of mind. As we said in Beck v. Farmers 
Insurance Exhange, 701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 1985), the "state of 
mind of the insurer is irrelevant; even an inadvertent breach of the 
covenant of good faith implied in an insurance contract can 
substantially harm the insured and warrants a remedy." 
Billings II, 918 P.2d at 465, n.2. 
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Since, under Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment should not be granted unless "there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law," the trial court erred in dismissing the attorney fees and punitive damages claims 
on summary judgment. 
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING STORAGE EXPENSES ON 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN LIGHT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE PLAINTIFF AND THE JULIE LEWIS TRUST, IN LIGHT OF THE 
FACT THAT U.S.F.&G. PAID STORAGE COSTS, AND IN LIGHT OF THE 
FACT THAT THE COURT AWARDED CLEANUP, SITE RESTORATION, 
AND TOWING COSTS WHICH WERE IN-HOUSE SERVICES 
PERFORMED BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
As set forth in the Statement of Facts above, the Plaintiff, after performing its salvage and 
cleanup operation on the wreck, transported the truck, crane, trailer and equipment to an 
enclosed and gated yard, approximately 6 acres in area, owned by the Julie Ann Lewis Tmst. 
Julie Ann Lewis is the handicapped daughter of Junior Lewis. Junior Lewis is the controlling 
shareholder of the Plaintiff and is also the Co-trustee, along with his wife, of the Julie Lewis 
Trust. Plaintiff is a closely held corporation. Because the close relationship of the Plaintiff and 
the Julie Ann Lewis Trust, the Plaintiff regularly stores its equipment on the Trust property 
without charge except that the Plaintiff pays the property taxes of the Tmst property as a 
business expense. (T. at 308-318) Although neither the Plaintiff nor the Julie Ann Lewis Tmst, 
are in the business of providing equipment storage for a fee to others, the property is set as an 
equipment storage yard and operates as such for the Plaintiffs purposes. 
The trial court held that storage is covered under the insurance contract (T. at 595, p. 27-
15 
28). See Addendum. The Court also held that die in-house salvage operation is also covered 
under the insurance contract. (T. at 595, p. 27). The same reasoning that the salvage operation 
should be covered provides the basis of why a reasonable storage fee ought to be allowed to the 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff could have lefused to accept the wrecked equipment and directed that it be 
taken to a storage yard that it does not control. Likewise, Plaintiff could have refused to clean 
up the wreck and requested that another company be used. In these cases, the Plaintiff, based 
on the court's ruling, would have been entitled to the storage fees and the cleanup fees. Indeed, 
U. S. F. & G., who insured the trailer in this same wreck, paid the storage fee for storage on the 
Julie Aim Lewis Trust property. Thus, the in-house services performed by the insured should 
be covered based on their reasonable value the same as if a third party had performed those 
services; odierwise, the insurance company is receiving a windfall. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Defendant refused to release monies owed under the insurance contract 
which were not fairly debatable unless the Plaintiff released claims which were fairly 
debatable, the Defendant has breached its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Thus, the court erred in dismissing die attorney fees and punitive damages as diey relate to 
the unfair actions of the Defendant. Wherefore, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that die 
Utah Court of Appeals eidier reverse the trial court's determination diat attorney fees and 
punitive damages be dismissed and remand to die trial court for determination of those 
amounts, including attorney fees on appeal, or diat the that die court remand the matter back 
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to the trial court for trial on the issue of the whether the Defendant acted reasonably in 
denying the claims of the Plaintiff within the purview of the standards of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. 
Plaintiff also respectfully requests that the Utah Court of Appeals reverse die trial 
court's determination that die Plaintiffs claims for storage fees on die Julie Lewis Trust 
property should be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted this f& day of February, 2003. 
DANIEL S. SAM 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, IlaadiCTnraaLun, do hereby certify that on February /x , 2003, I mailed first 
class, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to: 
Roger R. Fairbanks #3792 
LARSON, TURNER, 
FAIRBANKS & DALBY, L.C. 
P.O. Box 95821 
Soudi Jordan, Utah 84095-0821 
Beathei Eskelbon, fceg-alStiuelary 
II J&C.app.wpd 
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ADDENDUM 
18 
TRANSCRIPT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING (P. 26-30) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
NEWS TO THE INSURANCE COMPANY IF I TELL THEM THEY'RE GOING TO BE 
CHARGED WITH WHAT MR. LEWIS' ESTIMATE OF THE CLEAN UP COST WAS. 
THE COURT: I'M NOT GOING TO MAKE A DECISION ON THAT. 
THERE MAY BE SOME ISSUES. 
MR. FAIRBANKS: THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: WITH RESPECT TO CLEANUP COSTS AT BEST THIS 
CONTRACT IS AMBIGUOUS AS POINTED OUT BY MR. SAM. ON ONE HAND IT 
MAY BE ARGUED THAT THEY ARE NOT INCURRED, BUT ON THE OTHER HAND 
THERE IS SPECIFIC LANGUAGE IN THE CONTRACT WHICH SAYS THAT THE 
PROPERTY--PERSON IS TO TAKE CARE AND KEEP—PROTECT THE PROPERTY 
AND TO KEEP RECORDS OF THEIR EXPENSES. AND I THINK IT IS 
AMBIGUOUS AND I'M GOING TO FIND AS A MATTER OF LAW WITH RESPECT 
TO THIS ISSUE OF CLEAN UP COSTS THAT IT IS AMBIGUOUS. AND THEN 
THE COURT'S OBLIGATION IS IS TO GIVE THE CONTRACT AN 
INTERPRETATION WHICH WOULD BE REASONABLE AS VIEWED FROM THE 
LANGUAGE AND HOW THE INSURED WOULD READ THE LANGUAGE. AND BASED 
UPON THAT THE COURT FINDS THAT CLEANUP COSTS ARE COVERED. 
MR. FAIRBANKS: YOUR HONOR, NOT TO—I DON'T DISAGREE 
WITH THAT, AND I APOLOGIZE FOR INTERRUPTING, BUT I THINK VERY 
CLEARLY UNDER THE—IF YOU LOOK--IF YOU LOOK AT PAGE 2 OF MY 
BRIEF, THE POLICY VERY SPECIFICALLY STATES WE WILL PAY YOUR 
EXPENSES TO REMOVE DEBRIS OF THE COVERED PROPERTY CAUSED OR 
RESULTING FROM AN INSURED PERIL. 
THE COURT: YEAH. 
MR. FAIRBANKS: SO IT'S NOT REALLY EVEN AMBIGUOUS. THE 
26 
POLICY DOES PROVIDE DEBRIS AND CLEAN UP COVERAGE. 
THE COURT: THE COURT NOTES THAT THE DEFENDANT DOES 
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE PROPERTY DOES COVER CLEAN UP EXPENSES BUT 
MAINTAINS THAT BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF USED ITS OWN EMPLOYEES AND 
RESOURCES IT DOES NOT INCUR EXPENSE, AND I THINK THAT THAT IS NOT 
A SUPPORTABLE POSITION TO TAKE. I'M NOT SAYING HOW MUCH THE 
COSTS SHOULD BE. THEY SHOULD BE THE REASONABLE COST TO DO WHAT 
WAS DONE, WHICH SEEM TO ME TO BE REASONABLE, AND THAT IS TO TAKE 
THE EQUIPMENT FROM ITS PLACE WHERE IT WAS DAMAGED TO A SAFE PLACE 
WHERE IT COULD BE PROTECTED. AND IN DOING SO IT'S CLEAR TO ME 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF DID INCUR AN EXPENSE IN TERMS OF EMPLOYEES' 
WAGES AND EQUIPMENT USED. AND THERE MAY EV2N BE A DECENT 
ARGUMENT FOR INDIRECT COSTS AND ALL THOSE KIND OF THINGS. I'M 
NOT SAYING THAT THE AMOUNT IS OR IS NOT REASONABLE, BUT I'M 
SAYING THAT BECAUSE CLEARLY THERE IS AN ISSUE AS TO THIS MATTER 
WITH RESPECT TO WII^  T 'I HE COSTS MAY BE, AND I'LL RULE AS A MATTER 
OF LAW, THAT THEIR COSTS—REASONABLE COSTS IN DOING THE WORK IS 
AS GOOD AS ANYBODY ELSE'S REASONABLE COSTS IN DOING THE WORK FOR 
THE REASONABLE AMOL NT ~>F TIME, THE REASONABLE EXPENSES THAT WOULD 
BE INCURRED. SO YlUR MOTION IS DENIED AS TO CLEANUP COSTS. 
AS TO STCRACE, THE DEFENDANT ARGUES THAT THE CONTRACT 
EXCLUDED CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES AND PLAINTIFF MAINTAINS THAT THIS 
IS A CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGE. AND THEN IN THIS CASE THE PLAINTIFF 
ALSO POINTS TO OTHLR < ONTRACT PROVISIONS WHICH IMPOSE UPON THE 
PLAINTIFF AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO PROTECT THE PROPERTY FROM FURTHER 
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DAMAGE. AND I THINK THE ACTION OF TAKING THIS PLACE TO A PLACE 
THAT COULD BE PROTECTED IS, AS I'VE INDICATED, REASONABLE AND I 
THINK IT'S CERTAINLY A CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGE IN THE SENSE THAT 
THIS IS SOMETHING THAT HAPPENS IN A LOT OF, AS MR. SAM POINTS 
OUT, THAT THE PROPERTY IS TAKEN AND RENT IS PAID IN A LOT OF 
SITUATIONS. IN THIS CASE IF THERE IS AN AMBIGUITY THE COURT MUST 
CONSTRUE THAT AGAIN IN A WAY THAT A REASONABLE PERSON IN THE 
INSURED WOULD CONSTRUE THE CONTRACT, AND I CAN'T SAY AS A MATTER 
OF LAW, THAT THE CONTRACT EXCLUDES STORAGE COSTS. IN FACT, I 
THINK THAT THAT'S PRETTY CLEAR TO ME THAT THE INSURANCE COMPANY 
IS ENTITLED TO REASONABLE STORAGE COSTS. THE MOTION IS THEREFORE 
DENIED WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF STORAGE COSTS. 
HOWEVER, THERE IS AN ADDITIONAL ISSUE AS TO WHETHER OR 
NOT THERE HAVE BEEN ANY EXPENSES INCURRED. I REALLY THINK THE 
ESSENCE OF THE CONTRACT IS TO INSURE AGAINST LOSS AND EXPENSES 
WHICH WERE INCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE LOSS. AND I WOULD TAKE A 
DIFFERENT VIEW OF THIS IF THERE WERE ACTUAL OBLIGATIONS INCURRED. 
IN THIS CASE IT'S CLEAR TO ME THAT THE PLAINTIFF INCURRED NO 
ADDITIONAL COSTS OR EXPENSES BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT THE 
INSURANCE—THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD A RIGHT UNDER AN EXISTING 
AGREEMENT THAT THEY HAD WITH THE TRUST TO STORE PROPERTY ON THE 
PLACE WHERE THE—WHERE THE EQUIPMENT WAS TAKEN. AND AS WE HAVE 
DISCUSSED WITH MR. SAM, THERE WERE NO ADDITIONAL EXPENSES. AND 
UNLIKE THE PREVIOUS ISSUE OF CLEAN UP COSTS WHERE THE PLAINTIFF 
COULD SAY, LOOK I HAD EMPLOYEES WORKING AND I HAD—YOU KNOW— 
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EQUIPMENT WORKING. IN THIS CASE THERE HAD BEEN NO ACTUAL 
EXPENSES INCURRED RELATING TO THE STORAGE AND NEITHER IS THE 
PLAINTIFF LIABLE TO A THIRD PARTY FOR STORAGE. BECAUSE THE 
STORAGE OF THE CRANE CLEARLY COMES WITHIN THE PRIOR AGREEMENT TO 
STORE EQUIPMENT ON THE PROPERTY. THEREFORE UNDER THE FACTS OF 
THIS CASE NO ADDITIONAL EXPENSES HAVE BEEN INCURRED AND I BELIEVE 
THAT PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A WINDFALL HERE. THAT 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT IN THE BUSINESS OF STORING CRANES. AS I 
INDICATED, IF HE WOULD'VE BEEN IN THE BUSINESS I SUPPOSE THERE 
COULD'VE BEEN AN ARGUMENT THAT SINCE I'M IN THE BUSINESS OF 
STORING CRANES, AMD I STORED THIS CRANE, I LOST INCOME AND I'M 
ENTITLED TO SOME REIMBURSEMENT. THAT'S NOT AT ALL THE EXPENSE. 
IT LOOKS TO ME LIKE HE'S LOOKING FOR A WINDFALL HERE AND I DON'T 
THINK HE'S ENTITLED TO IT SO I'M GOING TO—THE LONG AND SHORT OF 
IT IS IS THAT ALTHOUGH I THINK THAT THE CONTRACT DOES PROVIDE FOR 
STORAGE IN THE APPROPRIATE SITUATION I DON'T THINK THIS IS AN 
APPROPRIATE SITUATION BECAUSE I DON'T THINK THERE'S BEEN ANY 
DAMAGES INCURRED. 
WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF BAD FAITH THAT WILL BE 
ALSO BE DISMISSED. I THINK THAT THESE MATTERS WERE—AS A M/vTTER 
OF LAW I THINK THAT THEY WERE ALL FAIRLY DEBATABLE, AND 
ESPECIALLY WHEN IT'S CLEAR THAT EVEN AFTER THE AGREEMENT WAS 
MAINTAINED THE PLAINTIFF CONTINUED TO HOLD TO THE IDEA THAT THEY 
WERE ENTITLED TO STORAGE COSTS AND REFUSED TO SETTLE. I DON'T 
THINK THAT THERE'S AN ACTION HERE FOR BAD FAITH AND PUNITIVE j 
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DAMAGES, OF COURSE, RELY UPON THE BAD FAITH, AND SO THAT WILL BE 
DISMISSED. 
AS WILL THE ISSUES AS TO ATTORNEYS' FEES AS THEY RELATE 
TO BAD FAITH OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES. THERE MAY BE OTHER CONTRACTUAL 
BASIS FOR THE ATTORNEYS' FEES, AND IF THERE IS I'LL CONSIDER 
THOSE, BUT I'M NOT GOING TO AWARD ATTORNEYS' FEES BASED UPON THE 
ISSUE OF STORAGE COSTS; AND I'M NOT GOING TO AWARD ATTORNEYS' 
FEES ON THE BASIS OF BAD FAITH; AND I'M NOT GOING TO AWARD 
ATTORNEYS' FEES ON THE BASIS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES. BUT I'LL KEEP 
THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AS TO OTHER ASPECTS OF THIS CASE, IF 
THERE IS ANY BASIS FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES BASED UPON (INAUDIBLE) 
OPEN. 
OKAY. DOES THAT TAKE CARE OF THE ISSUES THAT I 
SHOULD'VE ADDRESSED? 
MR. SAM: I THINK SO. 
THE COURT: MR. FAIRBANKS, WOULD YOU PREPARE THE COURT'S 
ORDER AND SUBMIT IT TO MR. SAM FOR HIS APPROVAL AS TO FORM. 
MR. FAIRBANKS: YES. 
MR. SAM: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU, MR. SAM. MR. FAIRBANKS, THANK 
YOU. 
(WHEREUPON THE FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE CONCLUDED.) 
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TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UINTAH ) 
I, MELINDA ROLLINS, CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER, DO 
HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I RECEIVED THE VIDEO RECORDED TAPE IN THE 
MATTER OF J & C ENTERPRISES, PLAINTIFF, VERSUS MID-CONTINENT 
GROUP, DEFENDANT, AND THAT I HAVE TRANSCRIBED THE SAME INTO 
TYPEWRITING, AMD THE FOREGOING PAGES, NUMBEPED FROM 1 TO 30, 
INCLUSIVE, TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY, CONSTITUTE A FULL, TRUE AND 
CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION, EXCEPT WHERE IT IS INDICATED THE VIDEO 
RECORDED COURT PROCEEDINGS WERE INAUDIBLE. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND OFFICIAL SEAL AT VERNAL, UINTAH 
COUNTY, UTAH THIS 3 DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2002. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: MELINDA ROLLINS t 
01/26/04 CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
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ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
E x h i b i t B 
Roger R. Fairbanks 3792 
LARSON, TURNER, FAIRBANKS & DALBY, L.C. 
4516 South 700 East - Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801)263-2900 
Attorneys for defendant 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
FEB ^ y 2C21 
jOANNkMcKEE, CLERK 
F3Y_ .DEPUTY 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
J & C ENTERPRISES, INC. 
a Utah corporation, 
plaintiff, 
vs. 
MID-CONTINENT CASUALTY COMPANY, 
an Oklahoma Corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 98080054 J 
Judge A. Lynn Payne 
This matter came before the Court on Tuesday, January 30, 2001. Daniel S. Sam appeared 
on behalf of the plaintiff. Roger R. Fairbanks appeared on behalf of defendant The Court heard 
argument on the motion for summaiy judgment of defendant. The Court, having reviewed and 
considered the memoranda, authorities cited, and the oral arguments of counsel, enters its findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and order as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Based upon the undisputed evidence submitted, the court finds that plaintiff used its 
own personnel and equipment for cleanup, debris removal and towing after the accident and is 
entitled recover under its policy of insurance with defendant for the reasonable value of said cleanup, 
debris removal and towing in an amount to be proven. 
2. Under the provisions of plaintiffs policy of insurance with defendant, plaintiff would 
be entitled to coverage for the amount of expenses reasonably incurred for storage of the salvage of 
its insured vehicle after the accident, however, based upon the undisputed evidence submitted, the 
court finds that plaintiff did not incur any expense for storage and is therefore not entitled to recover 
from defendant for any claimed storage expense. 
3. Based upon the undisputed evidence submitted, the court finds that there is no factual 
basis to support plaintiffs claims against defendant for bad faith, punitive damages or attorneys fees. 
ORDER 
Based upon the forgoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby 
ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the motion for summary judgment of 
defendant is denied in part and granted in part, and that plaintiff s claims for storage expense, bad 
faitli, punitive damages and attorneys fees are hereby dismissed, with prejudice. It is further oidcicd 
that plaintiff is entitled to recover under its policy of insurance with defendant for the reasonable 
value of the use of it own personnel and equipment for cleanup, debris removal and towing in an 
amount to be proven. 
2 
DATED this J. 3 day of February, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
A. Lynn Payr 
Eighth District Couil Judge 
3 
CERTIHCATE OF SLRVICE 
I licicby ceii.il} that a hue and con eel copy ofthc foigoing ORDER was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this J9J day i>f.Ku)iiai\ 2001, to the following: 
Daniel S. Sam 
319 West 100 South, Su.ic A. 
Venial, Utah 8-1078 
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FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
DANIEL S. SAM, #5865 
DANIEL S. SAM, P.C 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
319 West 100 South, Suite A 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone (435) 789-1301 
'..T-HOC/i/NTV UTAH 
•3 r A W DEPUTY 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF U1NTAII COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
J & C ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MID-CONTINENT CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Oklahoma corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Case No. 98080054] 
Judge A. Lynn Payne 
The above captioned matter came before the Court for bench trial on Febiuary 5, 2002, 
wherein, following the presentation of the parties' cases, the Court took the matter under advisement 
and ordered that the parties present post-trial memoranda as to the issues of interest and attorney 
fees. Following the receipt of the parties' post-trial memoranda by the Com t, this matter again came 
before the Court for oral argument on the issues presented in the memoranda on March 12, 2002 
The Court having reviewed the post-trial memoranda, the arguments of counsel, and after having 
given full consideration to all of the evidence presented at trial and being fully advise in the premises, 
stated its findings of fact and conclusions of law from the bench, and babed theieon, heicby, 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows 
1 Plamtifl is awarded judgment against the Defendant on the site icoloi ation, cleanup 
and towing (J & C Entcipiises, Inc , Woik Ticket No 4405, received by the Couit as Lxlubit 1 1), 
in the amount of $2,940 00, plus mtcicst thcicon at the rate of 10% per annum accming horn 
Septembei 26, 1997, until satisfied 
2 Plaintiff is awaided judgment against the Defendant on the remaining balance on the 
appraised value of the tiuck and ciane at issue in this matter n the amount of $10,000 00, plus 
interest thereon at the late of 10% pei annum, accruing fromDcccmbei 24, 1997, until satisfied 
3 Defendant shall icceive cicdit on the Judgment m the amount ol $4,000 00 winch 
constitutes the salvage value of the taick and ctane Plaintiff shall be entitled to ietain title to and 
possession of the truck and ciane 
4 Each paity shall pay their own attorney fees and costs 
DAI ED this [_ day of Apnl, 2002 
BY THE COURT 
2r; 
1c 
Districf Juch> v 
DANIEL S SAM, Attorney loi Plaintiff 
ROGER R FAIRBANKS 
LARSON, TURNFR, F AIRB \NKS & DAI BY, F C 
Attorneys (oi Defendant 
V J&CjmLwpd 
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ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendant on the site ic^toration, cleanup 
and towing (J & C Enterprises, Inc., Work Ticket No. 4405, received by the Cuuit as Exhibit 11), 
in the amount of $2,940.00, plus interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum, accunug horn 
September 26, 1997, until satisfied. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendant on the remaining balance on the 
appraised value of the truck and crane at issue in this matter in the amount of $10,000 00, plus 
interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum, accruing from December 24, 1997, until satisfied. 
3. Defendant shall receive credit on the Judgment in the amount of $4,000 00 whkh 
constitutes the salvage value of the truck and crane. Plaintiff shall be entitled to retain title to and 
possession of the truck and crane. 
4. Each party slmli pay their own attorney fees and costs. 
DATED this . day of April, 2002, 
BY THE COURT 
District Judge 
DANIEL S. SAM, Attorney for Plaintiff 
ROGjEEtR. FAIRBANKS 
LARSON, TURNER, FAIRBANKS & DALBY, L.C. 
Attorneys foi Defendant 
V/AC jmLwpti 
INSURANCE CONTRACT 
INLAND MARINE SCHEDULE 
ATTACHED TO AND FORMING PART OF POLICY NUMBER S^ 51940 
ISSUED TO J & C ENTERPRISES INC ~ ~ 
BY M3D-CONTINENT CASUALTY COMPANY EFFECTIVE"DATE 2 / ] 6 / 9 7 
3 TEM!/ SUBff DESCRIPTION - l i ! " ? ° £ 
INSU 
1 198 2 FORD LT9O00 WITH CRANE
 ? , n n 
2 1982 GROVE 50 TON CRANE, SS49271 ''O'-'onn 
3 1908 CAT BACKHOE, MODEL 416, SH5PC4531 * \ Q 'nnn 
4 1979 LIMKBELT CRANE, SI37G9171A 100 nnn 
-
r> 1900 CHAMP FORKLIFT, S0CCN1O6OO ">n'nnn 
6 ]£81 CHAMP 15 TON FORKLIFT, S310931 30000 
DEDUCTIBLE: $ 500. FOR ALL PERILS EXCEPT 
$1,500. APPLIES TO BOOM COLLAR-
AS RESPECTS ITEMS §2 AND U 
'!C0, 000 
AUTHOR!Z: 
v z. 
MID-CONTINENT CASUALTY COMPANY 
CONTRACTOR'S EQUIPMENT 
SCHEDULED COVERAGE FORM 
Various provisions In this policy restrict coverage. Read Iho entire policy carofully to determine 
rights, duties and what is or Is not coverod. 
7 hroughoul this policy, the words "you" and 'your' refor to the Named Insured shown In tho 
Declarations Tho words "wo," "us* and "our* refer to the Company providing this Insuranco 
Other words and phrases that appear in quotation marks havo specie) moaning Refer to 
paragraphs headed DEFINITIONS, 
A. COVERAGE: 
Wo will pay for "icss" to covered Property from any of the Covered Causo3 of Loss 
1 Coverod Prcporty, as used In this Coverage Form means 
a your cer'ractor's ecuipment and tools; 
b similar property of ctners in your caro, custody or control, desenbod in tho 
schedt!2 
2 Property Net Coverod 
Covered P. cporiy does net mean: 
a propc i/ whilo loaned, leased or rented to others, unless you prc/lo the 
opentcr, 
b blue pnr's, mechan cal drawings, plans or specifications, 
c tires ar c tubes, uriess 'loss" is coincidental with other covered "loss * 
d aircra'l, watarcraft, motor vehicles designed for transporting passengers or 
freight ever tne highway; 
e equipment or tools while waterccmo, unioss Coverod Property Is on regular 
farnoc cr railroad carfloals, 
f property whilo underground or underwater, 
g conlrcoand, or property In the course of Illegal transportation cr trade 
3 Coverod Causes of Lc3S 
Covered Cr.sas of Less mo3ns Risks of Dire.tPn/Jc^1 "loss" b tnu Leered F j e,t/ 
Gxcept thuso causes cf 'loss' listed In the Exclusions 
A Co/erago Extension 
a DelrU F emoval 
(1) VVJ wtl pay your o/aensos to remove delrls cf Ccveryj Procer;/ caused L ; 
c resuit'ng frcm an insured peril that occurs dunng the policy perlc J Tr e 
expenses w>l ce paid only If they are repo.tod to LS within 130 cays of tne 
car'Ier of 
(z) The date cf dlrea physical loss or damage, cr 
T^ , r P -i r o ii \ f f i 
(b) The end of the policy period. 
(2) Tho most we will pay under this coverage is the lesser of: 
(a) 25% of tho applicable Limit of Insurance for .direct physical los3 to 
Covered Property; or 
(b) $25,000. 
Tho limit of Debris Removal Is separate from the Limit of Insurance stated ' 
elsewhere in the policy. 
Tho Coinsurance provision, If any, In UIIB policy doo3 not apply to this 
additional coverage. 
(3) Tho additional coverage does not apply to cost to: 
(a) Extract "pollutants" from land or water, or 
(b) Remove, restore or replace polluted land or water. 
b. Additionally Acquired Property 
We will insure additional items similar to those scheduled, including equipment 
which you buy or lease "long term," but not beyond: 
(1) 20 days; cr 
(2) the end of the policy period 
whichever occurs first. 
Tho most we will pay In a 'loss' under this Coverage Extension Is the lesser 
of: 
(1) 25% of the policy loss limits; or 
(2) $100,000. 
Ycu must report these Hems to us wilhin thiny (30) days after you obtain 
them. Premium will bo charged from the dale of acquisition. If you fail to 
report new items within the thirty (30) day period coverage will end 
automatically at the earlier of: 
(1) 30 days after tho date you acquire the property; or 
(2) the end of the policy period. 
The Coinsurance Additional Condition does not apply to this Coverage 
Extension. 
EXCLUSIONS 
1. Wo will not pay for a "less* caused directly cr Indirectly by any cf the fcilcv/.r.g. Such 
"loss" Is excluded regardless cf any other C3use cr event that contributes concurrently 
or in any sequence to the "loss/ 
a. Govornmontal Action 
Seizure cr destruction of propeny by order of governmental authority. 
But wo will pay for acts of destruction ordered by governmental authority and 
laken ai the timo of a flro to provont Ita Bpread If tho flro would bo covorod under 
this Coverage Form. 
b. Nuclear Hazard 
(1) any weapon employing atomic fission or fusion, or 
(2) nudoar reaction or radiation, or radioactive contamination fiom any other 
cau80. Gut we will pay for direct "loss* caused by resulting flro if tho flro 
would be covered under this Coverage Form. 
c. War and Military Action 
(1) war, Including undeclared or civil war; 
(2) warlike action by a military force, Including action In hindering or defending 
against an actual cr expected attack, by any government, sovereign or otiier 
authority using military personnel or other agents; or 
(3) Insurrection, rebellion, revolution, usurped power or'action taken by 
governmental authority In hindering or defending against any of those. 
2. We will not pay for a "less* caused by o( resulting from any of tho following: 
a. Delay, loss cf use, loss of market or any other consequential loss 
b. Dishonest acts by: 
(1) You, your employees or authorized representatives; 
(2) Anyone else with an Interest In the property, or their employees or authorized 
representatives; 
(3) Anyone else (ether than a 'earner" for hire) lo v/nom you entrust the property. 
Tnis exclusion appiles whether or not such persons are acting alone cr in 
collusion with other persons or such acts occur during the hours of employment. 
c Unexplained disappearance cr ehortago found upon taking Inventory. 
d. Artlficialiy generated current creating a short circuit or other electric dlsturbanc-o 
within Covered Property. 
But, we will pay for 'loss* caused by resulting Tiro cr explosion. 
e Processing or any work upon property covered. 
But, we will pay for 'loss" caused by resuillng firo or oxplos.cn. 
f 1 ho weight of the load exceeding the lifting capacity of any equipment. Cucn 
lifting capacity shall be stated In the manufacturer's operating specifications for 
the operating conditions existing at the time of loss." 
3 We will not pay tor a 'loss* caused by or resulting from any cf the following. But if 
loss" by a Covered Cause of Loss results, wo will pay for that resulting "loss." 
a. Gradual deterioration, hidden or latent defects, any quality in tne propeny that 
causes It to damage cr destroy Itself, wear and tear, depreciation, corrosion, 
rust, dampness, cold of heat. 
b Mechanics fcre3'd:wn or failure cf Covered Property. 
C. DEDUCTIBLE 
Wo will pov tho amount of tne adjusted loss' in any one occurrence in excoss of the' 
dc-ducti'Vamcunt shcv,n in the Declarations, up to tne applicable limit cf Insurance. 
Pago 7r2 cf -
D. ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS 
The follov/Ing conditions apply In addition to the Commorclal Inland Marino Conditions 
and Common Policy Conditions: 
1. Coverage Territory 
Wo cover property within: 
a. the states of the United States (excluding Alaska); 
b. Canada. 
2. Coinsurance 
You must carry sufficient Insurance In order to avcid a penalty al the time of "loss." 
wo v/ill pay only the proportion of any "loss" that the applicable llmita of Insurance In the 
Schedule bears to 100% of the actual cash value of the itom(s) Involved at the time of 
"loss." Our payments won't exceed the limit of Insurance show In the Schedule for 
the Item. 
3 Impairment of Right* of Rocovory 
If you agree after a "loss" to waive your rights of recovory against any porson or 
organization responsible for the "loss," we shall not cover your 'loss.' Nor shs'l wo 
cover less or compromise v/hen you settle with others without cur consent. 
DEFINITIONS 
"Loss" moans accidental loss or damage. 
"Carrier" means a porson or organization v/ho provides motor, rail or air transportation for 
compensation. 
"Long-term" means twelve (12) consecutive months or more. 
"Pollutant" moans any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irntanl or contaminant, Including smoke, 
vapor, soot, fumes, adds, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste Includes materials to be 
recycled, roccnditlcned cr reclaimed. 
Pac^e ~ cf 
O M E 3 C I A I 1NUN0 MARINE 
COMMERCIAL INIAND MARINE CONDITIONS 
The f o l l o w ^ c o n d i t i o n s a p p l y i n a d d i t i o n t o t he Ccm.cn P o l i c y C o n d i t i o n , a r d a p p l i c a b l e A A M i c n . i l C o n d i t i o n s i n C o m m e r c i a l 
I n l a n d M a r i n e C o v e r a g e f o r m s : 
LOSS CONDITIONS 
A . ABAJCCWMEMT 
T h e r e c a n be no abandonment o f any p r o p e r t y t o u s . 
B . A P P S A I S A l 
, . . .. . „ , , , „ -x
 r h p n r c o e r t Y or t he a/ncunt o f " l o s s , " e i t h e r may make w r i t t e n demand f o r an 
f y e and y o u d i s a g r e e on t h e v a l u e of tne p r o w w * * , • • , • 
1 . Pay i t s c h o s e n a p p r a i s e r , and . 
2 . B e a r t h e o t h e r expenses o f t he a p p r a i s a l and u m p i r e e q u a l l y . 
, , . • • , - n
 r > ; n r . r i ; n our r i g h t t o deny the c l a i m . 
I f t h e r e i s an a p p r a i s a l , * : - i l l s t i l l r e t a i n QUI « J / 
C. DUTIES IK THE EYEXT CF LOGS 
You mus t see t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g a re dene i n the even t of " l o s s " to Covered P r - e r t y : 
1 . N o t i f y t h e p o l i c e i f a law mo/ have been b r o k e n . 
,. • • , ,w MI ^ c - •• i r r U x J e a d c s c n p t i c n of now, vnen and where t he " l e s s " o c c u r r e d . 
c. G i v e us p r o n p t n o t i c e o f the " l o s s , m c u c e a \*<.> ? , 
7 . . . . , , , r w - r i ~ n m o f how, when and where the " l o s s " o c c u r r e d . 3 . As s o o n as p o s s i b l e , g i v e us a o c s a v u c n U l • . , , , . . . . „ 
.
 K
 ' \ r,rnr*<-* the C o v - r e d Prc^rty frcn f u r t h e r carnage. I f f e a s i b l e , s e t t n e darr-ige 
* . Take a l l r e a s o n a b l e s f p s t o p r o t e c tne ^ ¥ - • • . , . , < 
. . ™<cih l<» o r d e r f o r e*amin3 t i c n . A. so xeep a r e c o r d o f y o u r e x p e n s e s f r 
p r o p e r t y a s i d e and m the b^Sv p o s s i o i e 01 - c i 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n t h e se t t l e tTv -n t of the c l a i m . 
5 . Hake no s t a t e m e n t t h a t . i l l a . s u r * any o b l i g a t i o n o r a * u t any l i a b . l . : - , . f o r any M o s s - f o r w h . c n we may --= 
l i a b l e , w i t h o u t c u r c o n s e n t .
 (| 
6 . P e r m i t us t o i n s p - c t t h e p r o p e r t y and r e c o r d s p r o v i n g l o s s 
7 , , > r ^ o ( M r n v r u u r d*» r o a t h , a t such tirr>:s as ma/ U r e a s o n a b l y r ^ u i r e c , a c c u t any 
7 . I f r e q u e s t e d , p e r m i t us t o c ^ e s . i c n ycu u n c , . ua>. , , 
, - , • « r v n i r r t a i m i n c l u d i n g yc^jr bco<:, and r e c o r d s , i n sucn e v e n t , y o u r a r . s « " r s 
m a t t e r r e l a t i n g t o t h i s i n s u r a n c e or your c l a i m , 1 ^ 1 ? 7 , 1 
mus t be s i g n e d . . , . • . . . 
. , . , . & ^ o ' nf " l o s s " c o n t a i n i n g the i n f o r m a t i o n w<: r e q u e s t t o s e t t l e t r ie c u m . T c : R T u . 
3 . Send us a s i g n e d , s w o r n s t a t e i ^ n s . of IOS ; , L - M V O J^ 
. . . ' . , ^ r ^ - i . o T U" w i l l s u c p l y you w i t h the r .ecessar / rcr.-ns. 
d o t h i s w i t n i n 60 days a f t e r cu r r e c ^ e ^ t . w. w i u -> y 1 7 
9 . P r o r p t l y s e n d us any l e g a l p a « r s or n o n c e s r e c e i v e d c o n c e r n i n g ,he . o < s . 
1 0 . C o o p e r a t e w i t h us i n t n e i n v e s t i g a t i o n or s e t t l e d or U e c l a i m . 
0 . IMSURAXCE U*CER TU3 CR rC$c. CXVEJU^S 
, , r -^ i / t o th*» Sd'>.' " l o s s , " we w i l l r o ; p i / , K r » i n o n t n e a c t u a l s r r ^ u n t or t r .e I f t w o o r r ro re o f t h i s p o l i c y ' s c o v e r a g e s acp l / t o 1 ^ . . r ' 
" l o s s . " 
E. LOSS PAT>^MT 
• . . . . ... „ r~H 1 n V r t h i s Coverage Pa r : w i : h i n 20 days a : t e r : 
Ve w i l l p a / or rrujke geed a n / " l o s s " c o v e r e d u r ^ . r i . n s v.- * 
1 . Ue r e a c a agreervc.ot w i t h y c u ; 
2 . The c n t r / of f i r ^ l j'^-Jgrr/rnt; 
3 . The f i l i r g o f an a p c r a i s a l aw^rc: . 
„ I ^ ^ . M . ^ T ' h r . b " * n c a i d or rr^de ".c«.d cy c ' r e r s . Ue w i l l r e : b - l i a o l e f o r o r / p a r ; of a U s , v.-a. n j , w . . P . 
F. 0THE3 IMCiJ^ .MCH 
, I pr.y c n l / t : 
,^n r^r* ' M o s s " as the i nsu rance Kinl*: ; m s Ccverac«? P a r * „ ' I f y c u h a v e o t h e r I n s u r a n c e c o v e r i n g tne . a ^ 1 0 , s . , ^ 
. . . „ . . „ , . , * < ! ^rr«n * n ^ o t h e r mr, . j r . i r .ee. J>? " j ' l v r-v/ r,i-« T • . . «»•• • - •• / «i L m • I . - . * ••'• 
t h e o t n e " i r s u r a n c e c r r e " . 
C PAIR, ScTS CM PASTS 
1- Pair or Set, in case of 'Moss" to any part of a pa\r or set we may: 
a. Repair or replace any part to restore the pair or set to i ts value before the " I n , , ' . „„•• 
b. Pay the difference between the value of the pair or set before and after ard
 a f ! e r \ h \ [ » \ Q ^ 
.2- Par ts , in case of "loss" to any part of Covered Property consistina of w r , i 
only pay for the value of the lost of damaged par t . * ' ' ^ *»rl* w h e n earpiece, we w i l l 
M. PRIVILEGE TO ADJUST UITH CUIER 
In the event of "loss" involving property of others in your care custody or control, we have the r ight to: 
1. S e t t l e the "loss" with the owners of the property. A receipt for navment frm rh 
s a t i s f y any claim of yours. ^ ^ ™ t h ' ° W n c r s of ^ a t property w i l l 
2. Provide a defense for legal proceedings brought against ycu. I f nr-widrd rh , 
our cost and w i l l not reduce the applicable Limit of Insurance under th i s I n s u r a n c T ' ^ ^ ' ^ " ' ' ** a : 
I - RECOVERIES 
^ recovery or salvage en a "loss" wi l l accrue ent i re ly to cur benefit-unci I the
 S U i ^ b y y = ^ ^ ^ 
J . R E I N S T A T E D OF LIMIT AFTER LOSS 
The l i m i t of insurance wi l l not be reduced by the payment of any claim, except for tor,! ... „ , 
which event we w i l l
 r e f L r < j t h c ^ ^ ^ j p r e f l l i u n o n t h a t i c c m > ' CX^?t for t 0 ^ l "loss" of a scheduled i rem, [ n 
K. TRANSFER OF RIGHTS OF RECOVERY ACAIXST OTHERS TO US 
1
 any person or organization to or for whan we moke payment vrcer this i p n , r w w 
- o t h e r , those r i s h t s are transferred to us. That p e r n o r organi a J ^ ^ " " r ' S n t S t C r — ^ S « frcn, 
r-Shts ,nd ^ s t
 d o n o t h i n g a f t e r , . l c s s „ ( 0 i r p j i r ^
 S
 '
Z a t , c n
 " ^ *> everythmg necess.-y to secure our 
GEK2RAL CONDITIONS 
A. CCHCcALKexr, MlSaEPREMXTAUCH OR fJJUJD 
is Coverage Part is void in any case of fraud by you relat ing to i t i t i- -il-„ V„;,J < 
™>srepresent a material fact concerning: J ° V ° ' d " ~'cu ' " t e n t i c n a l l y conceal cr 
i - This Coverage P a r r 
2- The Covered Property; or 
3. Your interest in the Covered Property. 
B- LEGAL ACT1CX AGAIMST US 
W
° °
n e f r
'
l y b r i n 9 a legal action against us under this Coverage Part unless; 
• There has been fu l l cccplianc? with a l l the terms of this Coverage Par- a-H 
e a c n o n
 's brought within 2 years after ycu f i rs t have knowledge of \he"»loss " 
C no BENEFIT TO EAILEE 
Wo p-rscn or organizat ion, other than ycu, having custody of Covered Prcp-rty wi l l h ^ n , < 
*~ '' ' c r i t frco t. i is insurance 
0 . POLICY PERICO 
co/er " lo5s" cc<Tnv;nc ir.g during the policy period shown in the Declarations. 
E. VALlMTic^ 
r h ? V a l u e o f
 prcc- r ty wi l l c- the least of the following amount:: 
•• The actual cash value of that property; 
3* ^ p Qf°Zl ° f r c 3 S c n a b l " / ^storir .G that prcc-rty to its ccrd-iticn inwediate'y b - f r f - " i ^ . . „ 
' ' ^ cost or replacing that property with substantially identical property. " * * "***' C f 
event of "losr,," tr.e value of prccerty wi l l be determined as of the tiuv
 0f " V - .. 
Mid-Continent Group ^ '-' " W 
MID-CONTINENT CASUALTY . MID-CONTINENT INSURANCE • OKLAHOMA SURETY 
1646 South Boulder Avenue, Tulsa, Oklahoma 
INLAND MARINE DECLARATIONS 
POLICY NO. SP 51940 
RENEWAL OF NO. NEW 
NAMED INSURED J & C ENTERPRISES, INC. 
MAILING ADDRESS P. O. BOX 1096 
VERNAL, UTAH 84078-1096 
POLICY PERIOD- FROM FEBRUARY 16. 1997 TO FEBRUARY 16 1998 
12.01 A.M. Standard Time at your mailing address shewn above 
IN RETURN FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE PREMIUM, AND SUBJECT TO ALL THE TERMS OF THIS POI ICY W P 
AGREE WITH YOU TO PROVIDE THE INSURANCE AS STATED IN THIS POLICY. ' W E 
lllufolZlri11^ ' N A N Y ° N E L ° S S 'S ™ E A P P U C A B L E L 1 M i T 0 F INSURANCE SHOWN OPPOSITE 
A ^ U ? ^ G E F ° R M D E S C R 1 B E D B E L 0 W 0 R INDICATED WITHIN SCHEDULES OR ENDORSEMENTS 
ATTACHED TO AND MADE A PART OF THIS POLICY. U K v C ' V , u ' ' ° 
THIS POLICY CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING COVERAGE PARTS FOR WHICH A PREMIUM IS INDICATED THIS 
PREMIUM MAY BE SUBJECT TO ADJUSTMENT. 
COVERAGE FORM T COVERAGE DESCRIPTION 
_ £ M J § i L _ _ l _ C O N T R A C T O R , S EQUIPMENT 
JM2150 I MOTOR TRUCK CARGO 
m 3 r
^0 I RIGGING ENDORSEMENT 
LIMIT OF INS. | RATE PREMIUM 
^ i S 0 ^ 0 _ | l _ 2 0 | § 1 W 
5 25.GQQ. | 1 £0 | i cr. 
S 50.0C0 J 1 C 0 | S SCO 
i TOTAL ! i c . ^ o 
THE DEDUCTIBLE AMOUNT IS INDICATED BY Q 
I—J . % of the amount of insurance on all insured itsrn(s) lost or da~c:c-d 
but not less than S 
L/J SSEE FORMS 
D s* 
COUNTERSIGNED FEBRUARY 15 19S7 BY 
DATE SCHAEFERMEYER-S,- = EDY~r^TfT 
G 0 T
 VERNAL. UTAH 
Mid-Continent Group ^ ; 
MID-CONTINENT CASUALTY* MID-CONTINENT INSURANCE • OKLAHOMA SURETY 
1646 South Boulder Avenue, Tulsa, Oklahoma 
INLAND MARINE DECLARATIONS 
POLICY NO. SP 51940 
RENEWAL OF NO. NEW 
NAMED INSURED J & C ENTERPRISES, INC. 
MAILING ADDRESS P. O. BOX 1096 
VERNAL, UTAH 84078-1096 
POLICY PERIOD: FROM FFRRUARY 16. 1997 TO FEBRUARY 16. 1803 
12:01 A.M. Standard Time at your mailing address shown abovo. 
IN RETURN FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE PREMIUM, AND SUBJECT TO ALL THE TERMS OF THIS POLICY, V 
AGREE WITH YOU TO PROVIDE THE INSURANCE AS STATED IN THIS POLICY. 
THE MOST WE WILL PAY IN ANY ONE LOSS IS THE APPLICABLE LIMIT OF INSURANCE SHOWN OPPOSI 
EACH COVERAGE FORM DESCRIBED BELOW OR INDICATED WITHIN SCHEDULES OR ENDORSEMEN' 
ATTACHED TO AND MADE A PART OF THIS POLICY. 
THIS POLICY CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING COVERAGE PARTS FOR WHICH A PREMIUM IS INDICATED. 'IT 
PREMIUM MAY BE SUBJECT TO ADJUSTMENT. 
COVERAGE FORM COVERAGE DESCRIPTION 
CM 7645 
IM21G0 
IM 30C0 
CONTRACTOR'S "EQUIPMENT 
MOTOR TRUCK CARGO 
RIGGING ENDORSEMENT 
LIMIT OF INS. RATE 
$460,000. 1.20 
$ 25.000. 1.50 
50.COO. no 
TOTAL 
REMIUM 
55,520. 
Wo. 
S 500. 
THE DEDUCTIBLE AMOUNT IS INDICATED BY LTi 
• % of Iho amount of Insurar.co on all insured ltom(s) lost or damaged 
but nol less than 3 . 
0 3SEEFORMS 
• S 
COUNTERSIGNED: 
GOT 
2/24/97 
FEBRUARY 16 1997 
DATE 
BY 
SCHAEFERMEYER-SHEF.DY-LFAV1TT <!';-
VERNAL, UTAH 
